COMMANDERS DIGEST
VOL. 14, NO. 4/JULY 26, 1973

U.S. Defense Commitments: EUROPE



DEFENSE SECRETARY SCHLESINGER

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

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Bipartisanship Cited

U.S. Interests Tied To Europe

The subject of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and related U.S. troop levels in the Alliance countries came before the Congress in mid-July. Pointing out the National Policy viewpoint to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 11 were three top officials of the Defense Department: Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger; Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and General Andrew J. Goodpaster, Commander, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).

This issue of COMMANDERS DIGEST is devoted to the viewpoints of these three Defense officials on the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

ON TARGET—The U.S. Army's newest missile, the Lance, provides fire support beyond forward edges of the battlefield areas.
(U.S. Army Photo)

Secretary Schlesinger:

Threat Remains

My statement will be short. Its purpose is to place on the record our interests and concerns, as I see them from my perspective as Secretary of Defense, and to provide a basis for my discussion today with this Committee.

I do not come here with any new reasons for our continued adherence to the NATO Alliance. The reasons are well known; they are ingrained in American policies over many decades. We are immutably tied to Europe by force of history and mutual interest. It is with the peoples of Europe that we have for so long shared the same basic conceptions of human ideals and purposes.

It is because Europe is so much a part of us—so much an essential part of Western Civilization—that we have labored in this century to help ensure European vitality. It is for this larger reason, as well as our own immediate national interests, that we have worked so hard, over so many years, under so many Administrations, both Democratic and Republican, to establish a solid foundation for Western security and for political stability and economic well-being.

In considerable measure, this farsighted objective has been achieved. The economies of Western Europe, while not without continuing problems, have grown impressively in the last two decades. Political stability, for the most part, has been attained. Another war in Europe, which in the late 1940s and early 1950s seemed imminent to many, has been avoided. Everyone on this Committee will recall the devastation that was in-



A Soviet "F" class submarine cruises near a Soviet "Kashin" class guided missile destroyer. (U.S. Navy Photo)

flicted on Europe by the second World War. Everyone here will recall the precipitate demobilization of American Armed Forces after the war, without regard to the lack of a similar demobilization by the Soviet Union. **Everyone here knows that it was the overtly hostile policies of the Soviet Union, backed by its large post-World War II military forces, that caused the nations in the NATO Alliance to look to their own defenses.**

Detente

Now by dint of NATO's perseverance and bold Western political initiatives, the policies of the Soviet Union appear to be changing. Now we are entering a period of detente. We have already, in the last four years, achieved a number of historic and important agreements with the Soviet Union. Negotiations for a follow-on Strategic Arms Limitations Agreement are underway. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the first phase of which the Secretary of State attended last week [first week of July], has just begun. Negotiations on the reductions of military forces in Central Europe will begin on October 30. Clearly, considerable political progress has been achieved in these last few years, and this progress is much to be welcomed.

But this encouraging progress toward detente has yet to reflect itself fully in the stabilization of the military balance. The Interim Agreement on strategic offensive arms contains virtually no limitations on qualitative improvements, or on certain entire categories of arms. The Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) negotiations scheduled to begin on October 30 will deal solely with reductions in forces in Central Europe. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union is continuing to improve both its strategic and general purpose forces. [Admiral Moorer discusses these trends in greater detail beginning on page 6.] I simply point out that the USSR is not unilaterally reducing its military forces because of its newly perceived interest in detente, but on the contrary continues to improve and strengthen its forces and to slow that process only in the context of negotiations affecting our forces as well as their own. **Consequently, it would be highly imprudent for us to plan our military forces on the basis of glowing reassurances regarding current Soviet political attitudes; we must also take into full account current and prospective Soviet military capabilities, pending the successful negotiation of further limitations or reductions in the forces of both sides.**

Need For Conventional Forces

With particular regard to Europe, we have heard the argument in the past that NATO did not need a direct counter to the superior conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact because of NATO's superiority in tactical and strategic nuclear

weapons. This may have been true in the 1950s, but now we are in a period of approximate nuclear parity. This clearly does not mean that there can no longer be nuclear war. Nor does it mean that the American nuclear commitment to the security of ourselves and our Allies has been outdated. The commitment is firm. **But it does mean that our nuclear forces no longer carry the same dominant weight in the balance of deterrence as they did in an earlier period, and this places a higher value on NATO's conventional military capabilities.**

If it was less important in an earlier period, it now is clearly essential for the NATO nations to ensure that we have credible deterrence—nuclear and non-nuclear—across the entire spectrum of risk, in order not to hold out to the Soviet Union the possibility of adventure at minimum cost, and in order to push away the possibility of nuclear war. No one wants a war. If we take appropriate steps, we need not expect a war. But war is less likely if we have both nuclear and non-nuclear deterrence. And in an era when the results of war could be cataclysmic, the insurance provided by adequate deterrent forces seems well worth their cost.

Warsaw Pact Balance

We have also heard the contention that NATO could not provide a conventional counterweight to the Pact at anything like acceptable peacetime costs. While Warsaw Pact forces do somewhat outnumber NATO forces in the central region of Europe, this is neither hopeless nor particularly reassuring. **The fact of the matter is that NATO already has the major part of the capabilities required for a stalwart conventional defense.** While important improvements are indeed needed, NATO can meet its existing deficiencies with limited additional efforts, if the NATO countries, including the United States, see to it that our defense efforts are complementary, if we ensure that our resources are applied to areas of greatest need, and if we have the wisdom and the will to keep up a steady defense effort.

There is no inherent reason why NATO must accept inferiority in conventional forces vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact. NATO outweighs the Pact by a considerable margin in basic assets. The population of the Alliance is greater by 54 percent. Our combined gross national products are greater by more than a factor of 3. What we need to do now is to tailor NATO resources devoted to conventional forces in Europe more precisely to the character of the conventional threat posed by the Pact forces. And, on a more fundamental level, we must face up to the fact that the alternative to an adequate NATO conventional capability in Europe is an earlier recourse to nuclear weapons, with all the risks that such a policy entails in this era of nuclear parity.

Allies Carry Share

It has further been argued that our Allies have not been concerned about their own defense or willing to carry a fair share of the burden. This contention fails to recognize the considerable efforts made in recent years. Former Secretary of Defense Richardson, in his annual Defense Report to the Congress in March 1973, noted the increases in Allied defense expenditures in the last three years —Allied defense budgets up 30 percent from 1970, with sizeable additional planned increases in British and German budgets for this year. Deputy Secretary of State Rush, a former Deputy Secretary of Defense, reported to you yesterday [July 10] on some of the European modernization programs. I can assure you these increased expenditures and new programs, and programs already planned for the future, are making an appreciable contribution to the capability of NATO forces.

Also, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) helps offset in significant ways the costs of our forces in Germany. The present offset agreement between our two countries amounts to more than $2 billion for 1972-73. A new agreement is now under negotiation for the next period. In addition, at the

An Air Force C-5A Galaxy jet transport lands at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, during an annual NATO exercise.
(U.S. Army Photo by Pfc Michael McNamara)

U.S. force structure is being examined to determine what changes might be possible to improve the combat-support ratio.

(DoD Photo)

NATO Defense Ministers meeting that I attended in June, the European Defense Ministers agreed to examine the problem of finding additional multilateral means to reduce the balance of payments costs that fall on the United States by reason of its stationing forces in Europe. I will be keeping in close touch with the offset negotiations with the FRG and with my European colleagues to try and uncover beneficial multilateral possibilities to meet our balance-of-payments deficit.

This is not to suggest that the present level of United States forces in Europe is immutable. It is to say that, in conventional forces as in strategic forces, we ought to determine the size of our forces in relation to the opposing forces, taking into full account the capabilities of our allies.

Unilateral Withdrawals Dangerous

The Alliance will begin negotiations with the Warsaw Pact on force reductions in Central Europe in just over three months. We are already hard at work in preparation. It is not unreasonable to assume that these negotiations will, in fact, achieve a lower level of forces on both sides; that, after all, is the purpose of the negotiations. **Unilateral reductions in American troop strength in advance would inevitably weaken our negotiating position.**

Also, we will be examining closely with the allies this year the possibility of changes in the present support arrangements, with the hope of sharing more equitably with our allies certain of the support and logistic responsibilities now borne by the United States. In addition, I am setting in motion an examination of our own force structure to determine what unilateral changes might be possible to improve the combat-support ratio.

Summing Up

In summary, our troops are still in Europe, after more than 20 years, not because of faulty policy, not because of inertia, not to save our European allies the trouble and expense of their own defense, not simply to maintain an American "presence," and not just to serve as a "trip-wire." Rather, our troops are in Europe because the forces deployed by the Soviet Union and its allies remain undiminished and, indeed, have been continuously strengthened; because a forward defense together with our allies is the best possible defense posture for the United States; because our forces contribute importantly to the conventional military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact—a balance that is of greater, not lesser, importance in this period of nuclear parity; and because the collective military strength of the Alliance helps to ensure political stability and enhances the prospects for East-West detente without unacceptable risks.

I am fully aware of the desire of many in the Congress to effect a prompt reduction in U.S. troop levels in Europe. But I cannot in good conscience recommend to you a unilateral reduction at this critical juncture. **For the first time since World War II, the Soviet Union has demonstrated a serious interest in easing the tension in Europe and in negotiating mutual force reductions. It would be foolhardy indeed not to give this process, already so well begun, a chance to work itself out. Moreover, it should be clear that, should the Congress decide on unilateral reductions in conventional forces, the only viable alternative to an initial conventional defense is an early recourse to the use of nuclear weapons.** In my judgment, our political stake and the potential consequences for our security are much too high to accept the inevitable risks inherent in unilateral reductions.

What I recommend is that the Congress and the Executive Branch consult more closely with the aim of maintaining a level of conventional forces in Europe that takes into account our stake in Europe, the progress of negotiations with the Warsaw Pact, and the possibility of greater burden sharing within the Alliance. This is the way, in my judgment, of greatest safety and maximum advantage for the United States. **This is why I strongly urge you not to consider favorably proposals for unilateral troop reductions.**

Adm. Moorer's Assessment

Why Warsaw Pact Possesses Military Might

Today, partially because of the considerable success [of NATO], many Americans are calling for a major reduction in U.S. military contribution to this great Alliance. They are asking legitimate questions and they deserve thoughtful and reasoned responses.

With world peace as our objective, we must continually search for the proper formulas to deter war. The great events of this past year have given us new hope for a more peaceful world, but these notable developments could not have occurred without the credible military power of the United States. True detente requires a reduction in the underlying political and economic sources of conflict, and an atmosphere free of force and the threat of force. Until these fundamental changes have taken place, however, we must, in the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, maintain sufficient military power to ensure that we can negotiate by choice, and not from coercion.

Europe and U.S.

The fate of Western Europe is of vital importance to the security interests of the United States. Should the Soviet Union, or any other power antagonistic to our national interests, gain dominion over Western Europe, the very existence of this Nation would be threatened. NATO Europe, with its industrial, economic, technological and military strength and potential, is second only to the United States in strategic importance to the Free World. Therefore, deterring an attack on Western Europe at any level of conflict, and continuing to foster the will to resist Warsaw Pact coercion, have a very high priority in our military planning. Should deterrence fail, NATO forces must be able to halt the aggression firmly and swiftly. Their capability to do so is essential to the credibility of our deterrent and could well be the decisive factor in whether we have peace or war in Europe.

Since such fundamental issues are at stake, **it is important not to risk serious instability in Europe at a time when mutual cooperation between East and West seems so close at hand.** I believe that a sound military case can be made for resisting the urge to reduce our forces in Europe unilaterally, while we continue to press for the ultimately more rewarding results obtained through Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions.

With this background, I would like to highlight the capabilities of the Warsaw Pact and give you a quick review of the NATO/Warsaw Pact balance which I presented to the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees earlier this year. It is important to keep the military capabilities of the Warsaw Pact in mind because it is my firm belief that we must fashion our military forces to deal with the capabilities of our opponents rather than attempt to base our plans on their intentions. Modern weapons require many years of research, development and production before they are ready for deployment, but intentions can change overnight.

Warsaw Pact Military Capabilities

The Warsaw Pact could employ against NATO a very large number of quick-strike weapons—over 550 intermediate- and medium-range ballistic missiles (MR/IRBMs), over 500 medium bombers, and a significant number of Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). After mobilization, there is a significant conventional ground attack capability—over 140 divisions, 30,000 tanks, and 12,000 artillery weapons—an impressive air support capability—over 5,000 combat aircraft—and a large naval force of approximately 160 major surface combatants and 200 submarines.

The bulk of the ground and air forces posing a potential threat to NATO is de-

A Soviet "Sverdlov" class cruiser at anchor in the Mediterranean Sea.

(U.S. Navy Photo)

ployed opposite Central Europe. Naval forces could conduct supporting operations in the Baltic and Black Seas, interdict sea lines of communication in the North Atlantic, and conduct offensive operations against the U.S. Sixth Fleet and other NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean.

The major component of the [Warsaw] Pact's quick-strike capability is the Soviet peripheral missile force. Nearly all Soviet peripheral missiles are deployed in the western USSR and we have good reason to believe they are intended for use against NATO.

Another portion of the strategic attack threat to NATO is the Soviet medium bomber force deployed in the western USSR. A large portion of this force is equipped with air-to-surface missiles; the others carry gravity bombs. Both are capable of delivering, and most likely are scheduled to deliver, conventional and nuclear weapons throughout Europe.

In the potential areas of Warsaw Pact operations—in the north opposite Scandinavia, in the west opposite Central Europe, and in the southwest opposite Greece and Turkey—the ground forces are trained and equipped to conduct both nuclear and conventional warfare. The majority of the force is Soviet, with the East Europeans also contributing significant forces.

Support for the ground forces would be provided by air defense, ground attack, light bomber and reconnaissance aircraft. Many of the aircraft are dual-capable, meaning they can be used in more than one role.

Central Europe Likely Target

We believe that the Soviet Union considers Central Europe to be the key to a military campaign against NATO. Although it certainly could be expected to strike into the northern and southern flanks, its largest combat force is opposite the Central Region of NATO. Of over 80 divisions there, the majority are Soviet. (A number of these divisions would require a period of mobilization before they could be considered combat ready.) The rest are Polish, East German and Czechoslovak. Additionally, there are over 25 Soviet divisions in the western USSR that could be committed to the battle in Central Europe. Upon mobilization, these units could attain combat readiness within several weeks and move to reinforce the attack. The largest aviation force is allocated to this central region. **Soviet concepts call for rapid movement across Europe by mobile armored and motorized rifle divisions in the wake of nuclear attack or saturation conventional artillery fire.**

Naval Threat

Looking now at the Pact naval capability, most of the naval forces that the Warsaw Pact could employ against NATO are Soviet. The Soviet Northern Fleet, with its formidable submarine force, has the greatest strike capability. The Northern Fleet would probably undertake offensive operations against NATO naval forces in the Norwegian Sea, and could provide support for Pact ground operations in the area. The Soviet Baltic Fleet, supported by Polish and East German naval forces, probably would attempt to neutralize NATO naval forces in the Baltic. The Soviet Black Sea Fleet, augmented by the Romanian and Bulgarian navies, probably would support Pact ground forces in an attempt to gain control of the Turkish Straits.

The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron is the most formidable and largest group of Soviet naval ships and submarines continuously deployed out of home waters, and, together with the Black Sea Fleet, constitutes the primary naval threat against NATO's southern flank.

Soviet ballistic missile submarines with medium-range missiles could be assigned



A Soviet BE-10 "Mallow" jet-propelled flying boat in flight.

(U.S. Navy Photo)

targets in Western Europe. The Soviet Navy also has a medium bomber and air-to-surface missile force capable of striking NATO surface naval forces.

The capability of Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces as they exist today is significant. For the future, this capability will improve as a result of vigorous efforts to develop new weapon systems. The Soviet Army has great mobility and firepower now. New equipment and ammunition coming off production lines will make it even more powerful. The air threat will increase due to the introduction of new aircraft and weapon systems. New fighter aircraft are expected to enter the force which will enhance their ground support capability.

Ongoing Soviet naval construction and modernization programs evidence qualitative improvements to platforms, weapon systems and sensors, with emphasis on Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) multi-purpose combatants. Consistent with these trends, the Soviet Union recently launched its first aircraft carrier, which will probably be Vertical/Short Take Off and Landing (V/STOL) equipped.

The Warsaw Pact military capabilities are indeed formidable, but I do not want to leave the impression that their forces do not have significant weaknesses. As I have noted, the equipment of the Pact forces is being continually modernized; but a substantial portion of it, while still serviceable, is old. We believe, for example, that our NATO forces are still ahead in most of the technical research and development (R&D) fields, but must acknowledge that this gap is closing.

The large peacetime ground force structure of the Soviet Union is only partially manned and requires augmentation from a reserve of trained individuals before it can be brought up to wartime strength. Thus, we should keep in mind that a large number of divisions in the Soviet Union would require several weeks of mobilization to be ready for combat. Finally, before considering the military balance in Europe, we must bear in mind that the Soviet Union maintains a major commitment of military forces in its southeastern flank, facing the People's Republic of China (PRC). Of the some 160 Soviet divisions and 4,500 tactical aircraft, about one-quarter is oriented towards the PRC, with the remainder oriented towards Western Europe or in a strategic reserve. Also, it should be clear to everyone that a major NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict would involve the nations concerned in global warfare, not just in the European Theater.

The NATO-Warsaw Pact Balance In Europe

There are differing views of the military balance in Europe even among our own governmental experts. The reason for this is that estimating the balance in Europe is by no means an exact science. It is complicated by incomplete data on the Warsaw Pact; by varying assumptions as to force availability on both sides; by analytical methods that are, at best, approximations of extremely complex battlefield interactions; and by the fact that

the outcome of a conflict may be heavily shaped by intangible and nonquantifiable factors, such as weather, warning time, combat readiness, leadership, etc.

The view of the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance I will present here today is a reasonable one, based on the extensive military expertise and judgment that resides in the U.S. military establishment. I will summarize my assessment of the balance between the NATO and Warsaw Pact major combat forces immediately available in Europe and adjacent waters and then again after a short period of mobilization.

As to the immediately available forces: On the NATO side, forces include only committed units physically present in the area in January 1973. French forces are not included, because they are not committed to NATO. Also excluded, because they were not physically present in the area in January 1973, are the remaining dual-based ground and tactical air units held in the U.S. for prompt deployment to Europe in an emergency. Royal Air Force (RAF) and U.S. Air Force (USAF) tactical aircraft stationed in the United Kingdom (UK) are included in this assessment (i.e., in the Central Region) because these units were physically present in the European area in January 1973.

On the Warsaw Pact side, forces include all active major combat surface ships, submarines and naval aircraft of the Soviet Northern, Baltic and Black Sea Fleets, and similar units of the East European nations. (Although not specifically included in this assessment, we should also bear in mind the large numbers of small surface combatants that would pose a threat to NATO ships operating in nearby European waters.) Tactical air forces include all of the East European active combat aircraft, the Soviet tactical aircraft deployed forward in Eastern Europe, and the Soviet active tactical aircraft in the military districts of the USSR facing the NATO northern and southern flanks. Ground force figures include only Soviet and East European combat-ready divisions in those same areas.

Except for the small Soviet ground and tactical air complements and the even smaller NATO ground and tactical air elements, the immediately available forces on the northern flank of Europe are primarily naval. As I indicated earlier, the bulk of the Warsaw Pact naval forces in this area belong to the Soviet fleets. Except for a few U.S. patrol aircraft and an occasional destroyer, NATO naval forces in the area are European. Aside from periodic exercises, U.S. general-purpose naval forces normally do not operate in those waters.

Northern Flank

Overall, the balance of immediately available naval forces on the northern flank favors the Warsaw Pact. NATO has a somewhat larger number of major sur-

U.S. Navy ships—including an aircraft carrier—at anchor in the harbor of Athens, Greece. (U.S. Navy Photo)

NEW AIRCRAFT—A Marine Corps AV-8A Harrier jet, a vertical and short takeoff and landing aircraft, prepares to land on the interim sea control ship USS Guam.

(U.S. Navy Photo)

face combatants, but the Warsaw Pact has a considerably greater number of submarines and naval aircraft. The naval forces on both sides, however, are quite large—reflecting the critical importance of this sea area for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Northern and Baltic Fleet ships must transit this area to gain access to the North Atlantic, and NATO must control this area to maintain access to UK and Northern European ports.

Southern Flank

On the southern flank, the balance of immediately available forces also favors the Warsaw Pact, as least in quantitative terms. NATO has a few more divisions than the Warsaw Pact, but the Warsaw Pact has more tactical aircraft, major surface combatants and submarines—notwithstanding a substantial U.S. naval contribution in the Mediterranean. Here again, most of the Warsaw Pact naval forces belong to the Soviet fleets.

Central Region

The NATO-Warsaw Pact balance in the Central Region with regard to immediately available forces is essentially the same as last year. The Warsaw Pact has a great advantage in numbers of divisions, but in terms of men in combat units (i.e., divisional combat units and nondivisional combat and combat support elements such as corps artillery, army aviation, combat engineers, etc.), the two sides are more evenly matched. Moreover, the Warsaw Pact continues to enjoy a distinct advantage in major ground forces weapons with more than double the number of tanks and artillery pieces held by NATO ground forces. The two sides appear to be about evenly matched in numbers of anti-tank weapons, but we anticipate that the NATO forces will gain an advantage in this category as the process of equipping U.S. and Allied Forces in Europe with TOW and other new anti-tank missiles is completed.

The Warsaw Pact has a distinct advantage in numbers of tactical aircraft immediately available in the Central Region, even including, on the NATO side, the U.S. and UK aircraft in the UK and excluding, on the Warsaw Pact side, all Soviet aircraft not actually deployed forward in Eastern Europe.

As I noted earlier, Warsaw Pact land forces can be brought up to wartime strength very quickly and then moved into forward positions in a very short period of time. Moreover, the ground and air units located in the westernmost areas of the USSR also can be deployed forward in a relatively short period of time and, certainly with respect to ground forces, before U.S. reinforcements can be deployed to Europe. Consequently, the Warsaw Pact advantage in ground combat power would be even greater after a short period of mobilization. In terms of men in combatant units, however, the two sides would be more evenly matched. The Warsaw Pact would still maintain its advantage in tactical aircraft, but to a lesser degree, depending on the number of aircraft that would be deployed from the U.S. under the circumstances prevailing at the time.

After a short period of mobilization, the overall naval balance on the northern flank could be reversed to favor NATO. A large number of U.S. and Canadian surface ships and submarines could be deployed into the area, including a substantial number of U.S. attack carriers with embarked aircraft. Moreover, some additional surface ships and submarines could be made available by our European Allies. With these additions, NATO probably would be superior in major surface combatants and in naval aircraft. The Warsaw Pact, however, still would be superior in numbers of submarines and small, surface combatants, and, since they would be operating much closer to their shores, they would be

more accessible to their land-based aviation and sources of supply. On the other hand, from a technological point of view, the NATO forces are still considered superior to the Warsaw Pact forces in Anti-Submarine Warfare.

On the southern flank, the Warsaw Pact, after a short period of mobilization, would be superior in ground divisions, but the two sides would be more closely matched in tactical aircraft. NATO would have a distinct advantage in naval forces, since additional Allied ships would become available and more ships could be deployed from the U.S.

Given a more extended period of mobilization, both the U.S. and USSR could introduce additional divisions to reinforce their deployed forces in Europe. It should be noted, however, that from a logistic standpoint, all USSR lines of communication to its forward areas would be overland and relatively short, while U.S. lines of communication would be long and over water.

Both sides, of course, could deploy their forces differently than assumed in this assessment, thereby changing the balance in one region at the expense of another. While NATO does have a conventional deterrent, the military balance in Europe, particularly in the Central Region, is tenuous as far as NATO is concerned. Further, the trend, in relative strength, between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is not encouraging. It is to reverse this trend that we are urging our allies to modernize and otherwise improve the combat readiness and survivability of their forces.

COMMANDERS DIGEST

Vol. 14, No. 4; July 26, 1973

A publication of the Department of Defense to provide official and professional information to commanders and key personnel on matters related to Defense policies, programs and interests, and to create better understanding and teamwork within the Department of Defense.

Published weekly by the American Forces Press Service, 1117 N. 19th St., Arlington, Va. 22209, a unified activity of the Office of Information for the Armed Forces, OASD (M&RA). Reproduction of content is authorized.

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Military Impact Of Unilateral Reduction In U.S. Military Presence

Following almost directly from this appraisal of the NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance is the conclusion that any unilateral reduction of the U.S. military presence in Europe, without an appropriate accompanying reduction in Warsaw Pact forces, would be most unwise for the U.S. and NATO. By appropriate, I mean a reduction in Pact forces which is arranged in such a manner as to account for the distinct asymmetries in geography, numbers, and offensive orientation that exist between the opposing forces in Europe.

It is not possible totally to separate the military impact of a unilateral force reduction from the political impact of such a move. I defer, of course, to the judgment of the Secretary of Defense and Department of State witnesses regarding the political impact of a unilateral reduction. But I would like to say that what I am most apprehensive about is that, as a result of the intertwining of the political and military impacts of a unilateral force reduction, we could find ourselves in a "downward spiral" towards a deterrent posture which no longer has credibility.

In the face of rising defense costs, NATO governments, just like the U.S. Government, are finding it more and more difficult to maintain their armed forces at required levels of strength and technological capability. Two trends are creating pressure on their defense budgets. First, there is a diminishing sense of danger from military attack in Europe resulting from the conclusion that this Soviet detente strategy is a signal of intent. Therefore, a basic feeling of security, buttressed by the series of recent successful East-West negotiations, prevails in many NATO nations. Second, domestic demands on government goods and services are increasing steadily with the expanding NATO-nation economies.

I believe that the NATO nations have been doing very well, during the past several years, in improving the combat capabilities of their forces. Should the U.S. now undertake a unilateral force reduction in Europe, one of two conclusions could be reached by other NATO nations. First, they might erroneously conclude that the military threat from the Warsaw Pact is reduced—thus, providing a rationale for reduction of their own NATO forces; or second, they might erroneously assume that the United States' interest in Western European security is reduced—which could cause individual nations to turn towards the Soviet Union. In either case, the net effect would be destabilizing to the current power balance in Western Europe.

On this basis, it follows that an uncompensated unilateral force reduction would put NATO at an increasing disadvantage versus unreduced and improving Warsaw Pact forces. The military effect of this would be to lower the credibility of the NATO conventional deterrent in the eyes of the Warsaw Pact. To wish for deterrence is not enough; the capability for a successful defense is necessary or the deterrent will fail. With a less credible deterrent, prospects for an attack increase. Should an attack occur, prospects for a successful conventional defense are lessened. Then, in a deteriorating conventional warfare situation, prospects for a forced resort to nuclear weapons to halt enemy advances are increased.

Therefore, I conclude that unilateral reductions in the U.S. military presence in Europe should not be made without appropriate accompanying reductions in Warsaw Pact forces. To reduce our forces unilaterally not only would remove the incentive for the Warsaw Pact to seek mutual reductions in the MBFR forum, but also would have substantial adverse military effects on the U.S. and NATO.

For 25 years, the United States has deemed it necessary to maintain substantial military strength in Europe against a widely perceived threat. Now we may be nearing a payoff point for these efforts. There have been notable changes in world politics, world economics, and perhaps in attitudes, during the past several years. In Europe we have evidence of this in the Conference on Security and Cooperation, now in progress, and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions talks, scheduled for October As I have already noted, I do not believe that we would be where we are now without our credible military strength. **We should not, therefore, through unilateral action, jeopardize the realization of the payoff we have sought for so long.** My best advice to you is that, until we are more certain than we are now that fundamental changes have occurred and that they are not transitory, we should continue to maintain our military strength in Europe.

During a joint U.S.-Federal Republic of Germany training exercise, a U.S. Army armored personnel carrier moves though the suburbs of Fulda, Germany. (U.S. Army Photo by SSgt. Charles Pierson)

Gen. Goodpaster's Viewpoint

NATO Alliance Has Been Tremendously Successful

I shall take as a point of departure for my statement today what I perceive to be the broad security objectives of the North Atlantic Alliance and of the United States in Europe. In my opinion, these have been the same from the very beginning, although the emphasis, of course, has changed to meet the changing situation, and continues to do so.

Two such objectives have traditionally been recognized: deterrence and defense. But I like to include two others, which I believe have always been implicit: solidarity and detente. Let me say a word about each of these.

Deterrence

The traditional objective of deterrence is today, as it was when the allied command was formed by General Eisenhower back in 1951, the chosen route by which to provide for the security of our people, while safeguarding their freedom. For the U.S. and the other NATO nations, deterrence means simply insuring and reinforcing peace by dissuading military attacks and military pressures. But I wish to emphasize that the aim of deterrence is not limited solely to the prevention of an overt military attack by the Soviet Union against the area of Western Europe. **As the members of this Committee well know, there are more subtle and sophisticated ways in which Communists the world over try to gain what have been called "the fruits of war without the costs of war."** In the NATO area, the objective of deterrence includes dissuading the Soviets not only from direct military attack but also from policies and tactics based on the exercise of indirect military pressures.

Defense

Deterrence rests squarely upon the second objective, defense. We must convince the Soviet leaders that our defense could impose costs on them that would far outweigh any expected gains. To provide an effective defense in Europe against attack from the East in this age of nuclear parity, NATO's military posture must include three interdependent components of military power under the agreed defensive strategy of flexible response—conventional forces, tactical nuclear forces, and strategic nuclear forces —in carefully coordinated combination.

The conventional military forces are the first element. In theory, one could conceive of three broad possibilities or options for these conventional forces. First, NATO could have a full conventional capability designed to deal with the full force that could be thrown against us without recourse to nuclear weapons. At the other extreme, we could settle for a low capability that could do little more than serve as a "trip wire." Between these two extremes it is possible to define an intermediate capability—one designed to cope with limited (less than full-scale) attacks, or with larger attacks for a limited period, or with still larger attacks that fail to do as well against us as might have been assumed. **The first, the full conventional capability, is an option low in risk but high in cost, which goes well beyond what the nations have demonstrated they are prepared to provide. The second, the "trip wire" approach, is a high-risk, low-cost option which has been rejected by NATO on the grounds that it lacks credibility.** The

NATO conventional forces, of which U.S. forces form an essential part, therefore fall in the range of the intermediate option.

Since these forces are not sufficient to contain with assurance indefinitely a sustained attack at full strength and full intensity by the forces arrayed against us, the second component of our military power, tactical nuclear weapons, is also necessary. These weapons provide additional firepower in case of need. The third component is strategic nuclear forces. These constitute the ultimate deterrent, and, should it ever be necessary, the ultimate defense.

Nuclear Umbrella

Here I would like to emphasize that each of these elements is necessary for successful deterrence but that no one element is sufficient by itself. **A capability for massive nuclear retaliation is certainly indispensable. But in the present period of relative nuclear parity, it would not be by itself a credible deterrent against all lesser threats, such as the threat of local aggression. Nor would it suffice to prevent the application of political pressures through military presence**—such as we see today in the Mediterranean Sea and along the shores of Africa and the Middle East.

Likewise, tactical nuclear weapons are essential, but they cannot provide the complete answer to our problem. A so-called "trip-wire" strategy on the part of NATO, involving token conventional forces and quick resort to tactical nuclear weapons on a massive scale, might tempt any potential aggressor to seek small gains in the hope that the West would be reluctant to initiate a nuclear war. Thus, instead of providing a deterrent, this strategy would tend to invite "adventurism" by the Communists and tempt them to local aggression.

Similarly, an intermediate level of conventional forces, as just defined, is not sufficient by itself to give assurance of deterrence, or of stopping a large-scale attack by an opponent who has nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, these conventional land, sea and air forces of Allied Command Europe have a vital role. When properly manned, equipped, and trained, they afford an essential means to meet aggression on the level at which it occurs. The provision of at least the intermediate conventional capability is thus essential to a credible deterrent posture and to military flexibility in response to aggression. Without it, the mere threat of aggression might seriously erode confidence in the resolution and solidarity of the Alliance.

NATO Solidarity

I consider this solidarity—collective action and unity among the nations of the Alliance—the third objective of NATO. Our integrated military command—which stretches from the North Cape of Norway across Central Europe and the Mediterranean to Eastern Turkey—joins with other institutions of NATO to serve this objective in three important ways. In the first place, through solidarity the NATO nations rise above the quarrels, the ancient hatreds, and the mutual conflicts of the past which have exhausted them and twice this century in the two great world wars have nearly destroyed them. Secondly, by uniting their efforts for the collective defense, "by acting together," as General Eisenhower liked to say, "the allies have achieved a result which, if they had acted separately, would have been beyond the reach of any or of all." Finally, by their solidarity within the Alliance, the NATO nations deny to any enemy the opportunity of taking them on one at a time, or playing one off against another.

NATO—Detente

As I indicated earlier, I consider detente the fourth objective of NATO. **Detente is a word which is much used these days—and, I might add, often abused. In a recent speech in Bonn, Sir Alec Douglas-Home distinguished between "real" detente and "illusory" detente, and the distinction seems to me both valid and important.** Genuine detente, a meaningful and durable detente, must be based on reducing and removing the **causes** of tension among nations, rather than merely the **symptoms** of tension, while at the same time preserving the security, the integrity and the values of our societies. In today's world, one preeminent cause of tension within the Atlantic area is the massive and still-expanding military power maintained by the Soviet Union. **A reduction in the surface manifestations of tension not accompanied by a reduction in the basic causes—what Sir Alec called illusory detente—carries considerable risks.** It could give our people a false sense of security, and lead them to drop their guard. Thus, it would actually increase the danger and reduce the stability of our position.

NATO A Huge Success

In achieving these four objectives—deterrence, defense, solidarity and detente—NATO and Allied Command Europe, its military arm in Europe, have been extremely successful. Indeed, it seems to me that we do not emphasize often enough—or perhaps not loudly enough—just how tremendously successful NATO has been. For more than two decades now, it has been the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, above all else, that has preserved the peace and safeguarded the freedom and prosperity of Western Europe and North America. Since the end of World War II, 28 years have passed without war in Europe. For comparison, 28 years after the end of the First World War, Europe had undergone the 6 years of death and destruction of World War II. This is the first time in many centuries that Europe has had so long a period of peace. **We cannot remind ourselves too often that, since the allied military command was activated by General Eisenhower in April 1951, not one square foot of Allied territory has fallen under Soviet domination.** Not one NATO nation has found itself forced to yield to military or political pressures from the East. And ancient enmities that bred two devastating world wars have given way to consultation, cooperation, and collective security.

I would be the first to agree that we cannot attribute this historic achievement solely to NATO's military strength. It is not possible to replay history to determine with certainty what would have happened without NATO. Nevertheless the 28 years of peace, progress and prosperity in Europe and the North Atlantic area contrast sharply with the wars and threats of war which have plagued Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Middle East during this period.

Era of Negotiations

Beneath the protective umbrella of NATO's military forces, the peace has been preserved in Europe. We have moved, as President Nixon put it, from an "era of confrontation to an era of negotiation." There are bilateral and multilateral negotiations on all sides, but most important are negotiations with the Soviet Union and her Warsaw Pact Allies.

The members of this Committee are, of course, familiar with these negotiations. Partly as a result of the long period of peace which Europe has enjoyed and the beginning of these negotiations, there has recently been an increase in the pressures that we see for unilateral reductions in NATO forces. The only point I would make to this Committee in this regard is that these pressures exist in almost every country of the Alliance. As Supreme Allied Commander Europe, I have occasion to meet with parliamentarians and officials of all countries of the Alliance. Everywhere, they tell me, there are voices which urge that terms of service should be shortened, forces should be reduced, and funds should be shifted to non-military purposes. Moreover, this seems to be an extremely contagious kind of virus. **Any actual reduction by one nation seems to be immediately seized upon by publicists in other countries who use it as a reason, or an excuse, for similar reductions of their own.**

The Threat

This situation would not be so serious if the same process were taking place on the other side of the Iron Curtain, but this is not what the evidence shows. Indeed, the hard facts are just the opposite. **Despite all the attention given to detente and accommodation, the last few years have been marked by a continuing —and disturbing—growth in Russian military strength.** In each one of the last six years—since the time of the removal of Khruschev—the Soviet military budget has increased in real terms over the military budget of the previous year. Recent published estimates indicate that the Russian military budget exceeds that of the United States, although their total national economy is only half as large.

The growth of Soviet strategic nuclear capabilities has progressively changed the strategic balance in a direction adverse to the West. From its position of overwhelming superiority of a few years ago, the West has dropped to a position of nuclear equality and—in some aspects —of nuclear inferiority.

In Central Europe, the ground forces of the Soviet Union and her Warsaw Pact allies outnumber the forces of the West in terms of divisions, firepower and manpower. In addition, the Warsaw Pact divisions are steadily increasing in combat power as they receive new tanks, new personnel carriers, new missiles and additional artillery. These forces are far larger than would be necessary for defense. In terms of air strength, the Warsaw Pact has twice as many combat aircraft as NATO. They have more aircraft, more airfields, more shelters, more command and control facilities, and more anti-aircraft defenses. Moreover, newer types of high-performance aircraft have been introduced by the Soviets into their air forces and those of their Warsaw Pact Allies.

The expansion of Soviet naval power has been a matter of particular concern in recent times. From a sort of large-scale coastal defense force a generation ago, the Soviet Navy has become the second largest fleet in the world. In the event of war, it could impose heavy losses on our sea lines of communications.

These are some of the elements of the pattern of Soviet military strength and activity. There is a steady trend of expansion, widened deployments and increasing presence in new strategic areas of the world.

I want to emphasize, however, that despite these increases in the military forces of the Warsaw Pact, NATO forces continue to hold them in check in Europe and the Atlantic. I think they can continue to do so if we keep up our strength and unity. I am sure the Soviet leaders have no desire to take us on militarily as long as we display our collective armed strength of the present size and effectiveness.

To summarize the situation, then, NATO and the United States face today a kind of paradox—on the one hand continuing negotiations with some tendencies toward weakening of public support for military programs, and on the other growing Soviet forces—already the greatest concentration of military power the world has ever seen. The Soviets are showing that they have the capability of pursuing policies of detente and military strength at the same time. If we in the West cannot muster the same capability, we will leave ourselves vulnerable to division, inferiority and instability in the period that lies ahead. What should we do in this situation?

The primary thing we should do, I believe, is to keep a keen edge on our processes of alertness and judgment. We should take conscious care not to slip further into a complacency that is already all too widespread in connection with military needs and problems. We must realize, and somehow make sure the public realizes, that the military strength of NATO is not in conflict with the search for detente and peace. It is rather an essential element, an indispensable underpinning, for that search. As NATO itself put it in the Harmel Report in 1967, "Military security and a policy of detente are not contradictory but complementary. Collective defense is a stabilizing factor in world politics. It is the necessary condition for effective policies directed towards a greater relaxation of tensions."

MBFR Negotiations

At present, for example, I personally consider Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions a promising possibility. But this possibility in itself is a strong reason **not** to make any unilateral force reductions or to take any action that would weaken the capabilities or the readiness of our forces-in-being. The other side would have little need or incentive to make reductions in their forces if they were convinced that the NATO countries, because of internal pressures and problems, were going to reduce their military forces in any case. Moreover, such a one-sided reduction in strength would impair and imperil the stability upon which peace and security now rest.

This proposition is true for NATO in general. It is no less true for the United States. Let me review briefly the reasons that U.S. forces continue to play a vital role in the defense of Western Europe. When in 1951 the four additional U.S. divisions were brought to Europe to help form the military arm of NATO, they put, in General Eisenhower's words, "the glue into NATO." The Randall Subcommittee last year concluded in almost the same terms, that the U.S. forces in Europe continue to make the same contribution today. Many things have changed in the last 20 years; this is one thing which remains the same.

In this area there are, I believe, a number of misconceptions in the public mind. For example, the question is often asked, **"Why are U.S. troops still in Europe 28 years after the end of World War II?"** Posed in these words, the question is an invitation to confusion. I consider **the right question** is

3 May 1973

REVISED DATA ON DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AND GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT—1972

	Defense Expenditures (million US $) (1)	GNP (million US $) (2)	Population (thousands) (3)	GNP/ Capita (US $) (4)	Index of GNP/ Capita (US = 1.00) (5)	Defense Expenditures as % of GNP (6)	Index of Defense Expenditures as % of GNP (US = 1.00) (7)	Ratio of Indices (Col 7/ Col 5) (8)
BELGIUM	998.5	30,614	9,764	3,135	0.620	3.3	0.440	0.710
CANADA	2,138.0	85,831	21,941	3,912	0.773	2.5	0.333	0.431
DENMARK	459.8	17,360	5,003	3,470	0.686	2.7	0.360	0.524
FRANCE	7,193.5	171,690	51,660	3,323	0.658	4.2	0.560	0.852
FED. REP. OF GERMANY	8,995.1	227,442	61,916	3,673	0.726	4.0	0.534	0.735
GREECE		610	209	2,919	0.236	5.3	0.706	3.000
ICELAND	557.2	10,496	8,817	1,190	0.576	0.0	0.000	0.000
ITALY	3,348.6	106,392	54,403	1,955	0.387	3.1	0.413	1.070
LUXEMBOURG	11.6	1,088	344	3,163	0.626	1.1	0.147	0.235
THE NETHERLANDS	1,516.9	40,062	13,352	3,000	0.594	3.8	0.506	0.854
NORWAY	499.2	13,114	3,936	3,332	0.659	3.8	0.506	0.770
PORTUGAL	607.7	7,305	8,835	827	0.164	8.3	1.109	6.760
TURKEY	690.6	13,786	37,064	372	0.074	5.0	0.667	9.060
UNITED KINGDOM	8,021.7	139,309	55,946	2,490	0.492	5.8	0.773	1.570
UNITED STATES	79,528.0	1,057,804	209,223	5,056	1.000	7.5	1.000	1.000
NATO EUROPE	32,900.4	779,268	311,249	2,504	0.496	4.2	0.560	1.130
NATO OTHER THAN U.S.	35,038.4	865,099	333,190	2,595	0.514	4.05	0.540	1.050
TOTAL NATO	114,566.4	1,922,903	542,413	3,545	0.701	6.0	0.800	1.140
NATO NORTH & CENTRAL EUROPE *	27,696.3	640,679	201,921	3,180	0.628	4.3	0.573	0.914

* Includes Belgium, Denmark, France, FRG, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, and United Kingdom.

not how long it has been **since** World War II, **it is how long it is before World War III?** The U.S. troops in Europe are there to keep World War III from taking place, and they have been succeeding in this task for nearly three decades.

A second version of the question is almost as faulty, and as pernicious: "Why are U.S. troops in Europe to defend the Europeans—why don't the Europeans defend themselves?" The answer to this charge is, first of all, U.S. forces are there as the best means of defending the United States, as two wars have shown, and beyond this, that the bulk of the defense forces in Europe are in fact provided by the Europeans—some 90 percent of the ground forces, 80 percent of the ships, and 75 percent of the air forces. This is an important fact that is all too little realized in the United States.

Moreover, if we gauge a proper sharing of the budgetary burden by defense expenditures as a percentage of gross national product in relation to per capita income, it turns out that there is a close match between what the U.S. is doing and what the other allies, in total, are doing. I have had a table prepared which I believe demonstrates this quite clearly and which I would like to insert into the Committee record (See above).

There remains beyond this the important question of the balance-of-payments effects of stationing U.S. forces in Europe; here I am happy to see that the European allies are showing an increasing readiness to study this problem and come up with a solution.

But although the U.S. forces we have in Europe are a limited fraction of the NATO total, they are at the same time an indispensable and irreplaceable part of the collective strength. And they are in Europe, I would emphasize, first and foremost because their presence serves and supports important interests of the **United States**—economic interests, cultural interests, and, above all, **security** interests. The U.S. economic stake in Europe is tremendous, and we also have important cultural and psychological connections there. But it is, above all, U.S. **security** interests that are involved in Europe.

There are, I believe, three propositions that are basic to United States security interests in this regard. The first proposition is that NATO, or something like it, is essential to the security interests of the United States, just as I believe it is to the security interests of every other member of NATO. Without NATO, the West would lie exposed to Soviet pressure, to Soviet efforts to pick off countries one by one, and to dangerous instability and threats to peace.

The second proposition is that a substantial collective force-in-being, in place in Western Europe, is essential to a viable NATO and therefore to United States security. **Without such a real, living force in being, NATO could become no more than a "scrap of paper," like other treaties before it. Moreover, if this collective force-in-being were lost, I for one, do not believe it could be rebuilt.**

The third proposition is that a bal-

Members of a West German Panzer regiment move into position near the city of Morlbach during Reforger IV, a NATO exercise.
(U.S. Army Photo by Sp4 Dennis Spiegelhaulder)

anced American military force contribution in the European area, not substantially less than we have there today, is at present essential to the continued existence of a strong collective force; therefore, to the continued effectiveness and viability of NATO, and therefore to the security interests of the United States. This will remain true until mutual reductions can be made with the other side. And a clinching point to me in all this is that the forces we have in Europe are much more effective militarily in achieving our aims of deterrence, peace and stability by being **there** than by being in the United States. **President Nixon trenchantly underlined this same conclusion when he said, "The United States can no more disengage from Europe than from Alaska."**

Certainly the burden of maintaining these forces and of defense in general is not light. The measures that I urge—maintaining forces at their present levels until the Soviet Union agrees to balanced reductions, and making clear to the public that military strength and a policy of detente are not contradictory but complementary—these policies will not be cheap nor can they be expected to prove universally popular in this era of apparent detente. In 1951, when he addressed the Congress of the United States, General Eisenhower predicted, "The cost of peace is going to be a sacrifice, a very great sacrifice, individually and nationally. But total war is a tragedy; it is probably the suicide of civilization."

Today, total war seems to be much more remote than it seemed in 1951. But it remains true that, in a literal sense, the measure of a nation's devotion to freedom and to a secure peace is to be found by asking what efforts and sacrifices it will make for this purpose. We can well heed the warning that Somerset Maugham gave back in the dark days of 1941: **"If a nation values anything more than freedom, it will lose its freedom; and the irony of it is that if it is comfort or money that it values more, it will lose that too."**

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Subscription Price: $4.50 domestic per year; $1.25 additional for foreign mailing; 10 cents per single copy.
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